CHATTER, CLATTER, AND BLINKS:
DEFECTIVE CAR ALERTS AND THE ROLE OF
TECHOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN DESIGN
DEFECT/FAILURE TO WARN CASES
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ABSTRACT
Car owners are familiar with the warning lights on the
dashboard and the beeping sound reminding them to use their
seatbelt. But, neither the legislature nor courts have concretely
defined the legal nature of these alerts. This iBrief will analyze
when a deficient alert becomes a defective product tort claim and
determine the appropriate theory under which such claims should
be brought.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
In product manufacturing, a design that is not as safe as reasonably
possible both subjects users to unnecessary risk and subjects sellers to tort
liability. Likewise, the users of products must be supplied with all
reasonable warnings to protect them from unknown dangers and to protect
manufacturers from prosecution.
¶2
The line between design defect and failure to warn can be difficult
to discern. It can also be difficult to discern the difference between optional
safety features and features necessary to make a product usable. These
distinctions can be explored by analyzing audio and visual alerts in
automobiles. With the widespread use of light up displays, beeping noises,
and verbal audio cues, differentiating between just safe enough and unsafe
can become complicated. Such alarms could be characterized as warnings;
thus, a deficiency could amount to a failure to warn of dangerous
conditions. Conversely, they could be seen as safety features of the car, like
mirrors and seatbelts, subject to design defect claims. After careful
analysis, it becomes clear that the range of what warnings are safe enough is
broad, but the best reading of case law restricts such deficiencies to design
defect litigation.
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¶3
The only types of defect being considered here are design defect
and failure to warn. Manufacturing defects, as unintentional acts with strict
liability imposed upon them, can happen to any object regardless of
technology and regardless of what component is defective. For the
purposes of this analysis, it will be useful to assume all products are
accurately manufactured. The only aspects of interest here are those
intentionally included by manufacturers which are alleged to be defective.

I. TECHNOLOGY, LEGAL DUTIES, AND OBSOLETE PRODUCTS
In the course of human progression, new technologies are
constantly surpassed by newer technologies. The law recognizes this
progression, and where the use of technology is related to legal duties, the
use of modern technology is subsumed into that legal duty. If one has a
duty to give information to Mr. Smith in California in a timely manner, it
would not be sufficient in 2008 to send the letter by ox-drawn wagon. It is
assumed that you will and must use some form of electronic communication
or else some postal service which can deliver it in a week, rather than in
months. Police are expected to utilize forensic evidence in ways
unavailable 200 years ago. Doctors will be liable for malpractice if, instead
of running necessary tests and proscribing medicine, they treat every illness
with bloodletting.
¶4

¶5
In this same way, safety features and warnings on products must
utilize available technology. Warnings concerning medical procedures can
take up many pages; warnings of this length would have been impractical
and ineffective before the printing press and inexpensive paper production,
when they would have been transmitted orally. Originally, car windshields
were made of normal glass; 2 now, a car that does not take advantage of
safer glass designs runs a high risk of being found unreasonably dangerous.3
¶6
In this way, safe products, safe designs, and safe warnings can all
become unsafe when a safer alternative becomes available. In the case of
The T. J. Hooper, 4 Learned Hand explained how the absence of radio
receivers on tugboats made those tugboats defective. At that time, it was
not yet common practice for tugboats to carry these radios.5 Despite that
fact, such radios were not expensive, cumbersome, or difficult to use. 6
2

See National Glass Association, Your Windshield is Not Just a "Wind-Shield"
Any More, http://www.speedyglass.com/auto-glass-news/2009/03/yourwindshield-is-not-just-wind-shield.html, http://www.speedyglass.com/autoglass-news/2009/04/your-windshield-is-not-just-wind-shield.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2010).
3
See id.
4
The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1932).
5
Id.
6
Id.
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Analyzing the role of common practice or custom in determining reasonable
safety provisions, the court said that
in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged
in the adoption of new and available devices. . . . Courts must in the
end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission. 7

The mere availability of this technology made its absence tortuous.
¶7
There are two considerations in determining when new technology
must be utilized to make a product reasonably safe. The first is local
statute. Different states have different requirements for when new scientific
knowledge must be incorporated into new products. For example, the
California and Alaska Supreme Courts have held that products must
conform to “reasonably scientifically knowable” information.8 By contrast,
the Colorado Supreme Court takes a stance more akin to strict liability. 9
Arizona has adopted a “knew or should have known” standard for some of
its product defect cases. 10 Variation in state standards makes it impossible
to generalize when a product becomes obsolete.

The second deciding factor of when new technology must be
utilized is the reasoning of the finder of fact. Reasonableness, whether in
design or in warning, is a question of fact.11 While judges occasionally rule
on the reasonableness of designs, 12 ideally such findings are left for the
jury; judges should only step in when the evidence is so lopsided that only a
mistake could account for the jury finding contrary to the evidence. 13
Because of the jury’s role as a fact finder, there should never be a bright line
rule concerning when a product becomes obsolete and defective. Each case
needs individualized analysis.
¶8

II. CAR ALERTS AS DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
¶9
Car alerts, like every other aspect of an automobile, can be
defective. They can suffer from poor design, construction, or instructions
7

Id. (citations omitted).
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Shanks v. Upjohn Co.,
835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992).
9
See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo.
1983).
10
Powers v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 174 P.3d 777 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
11
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998); see also
Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 215 (3rd Cir. 1991).
12
See, e.g., Smith v. Louisville Ladder Corp., 237 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2001); see
also GMC v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1999).
13
Jackson v. OMI Corp., 245 F.3d 525, 528 (5th Cir. 2001).
8

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 010

for use. However, it is difficult to say how such devices should be judged
for adequacy, since some alerts might be more effective than others.
¶10
There are many different technologies available for car alerts.
Many cars include visual cues on the dashboards, such as gauges and
lighted symbols, alerting a driver of the available gas, the temperature of the
car, etc. 14 Sometimes, these visual cues take the form of written words,
when the dashboard is equipped with a display; such displays can alert a
driver in printed text that the oil needs replacing or that the weather is cold
enough for ice hazards to be possible. 15 There are also auditory cues given
by cars. Some cars make beeping or buzzing noises when activated,
indicating the keys are still in the ignition, the car is low on fuel, or the
seatbelts are not being used. While few cars use verbal cues (recorded
audio voice messages) for such safety concerns, the technology is neither
novel nor expensive 16 and is used extensively in automobile GPS systems.17
¶11
With so many alerts available, the manufacturer must decide which
warning system is best. Beyond the desire to make car alerts more effective
so as to prevent dangerous incidents, this question is legally important for
car manufacturers. If it can be shown that a different option (say, verbal
alerts) would have made the car safer or warned of a danger better than the
existing alert (say, a lit symbol on the dash), then the manufacturer risks a
finding of defectiveness on the entire line of vehicles.
¶12
Different people might find different warning styles to be more
effective. Some people respond better to visual stimuli while others
respond best to audio stimuli. 18 This would seem to relax the requirement
that a warning be as effective as possible, since there is no uniformly “most
effective” method of warnings. However, a reasonable alternate design or
warning does not need to be proven safer every time for every person to be
a legal requirement. 19 It is enough that in the totality of the evidence, the
proposed alternative would make the product safer overall. If one alert is

14

See GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 2005 CHEVROLET COBALT OWNERS
MANUAL 3-21 (2004).
15
See id. at 3-35.
16
See, e.g., Independent Living Aids, Inc.: Digital Talking Watch with Voice
and Alarm, www.independentliving.com/prodinfo.asp?number=756241 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2010) (selling a talking alarm watch for the sight impaired for
$5.00).
17
See, e.g., Consumer Reports: GPS Features,
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/tires-auto-parts/gps/gps-buyingadvice/gps-features/gps-features.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (detailing the
feature of giving spoken street names when giving directions).
18
See generally Felicia Lincoln, Learning Styles of ESL Students in Community
Colleges, 30 COMMUNITY C. J. RES. & PRAC 484 (2006).
19
Smith v. Louisville Ladder Corp., 237 F.3d 515, 531–32 (5th Cir. 2001).
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shown to be less effective generally than another, it runs a risk of being
found defective.
¶13
There are some generalizations that can be used to determine which
warnings are more effective. Usually, the more specific a warning is, the
easier it is to understand and weigh accurately. A light on the dash that says
“CHECK ENGINE” would generally be less effective in getting a person to
stop a car than a warning that says “ENGINE IS ABOUT TO EXPLODE-TURN
ENGINE OFF NOW.” Research shows the best way to get a person’s attention,
especially if he is busy with other sensory input, is to give him both a visual
cue and an auditory cue.20 From this it would seem to follow that any
important alert that is merely a light or merely a beep is deficient, and can
be made more effective by combining audio and visual cues and by making
the meaning of the alert clearer.

However, the mark of a reasonable alternative is more than merely
whether it is safer. For design defect cases, the proposed alternative must
also take into account cost, desires in the marketplace, aesthetics, etc.21
Failure to warn cases must take into account the decreased value of each
warning as more warnings are added, detracting from their perceived
importance. 22 If every alert had a loud audio component and bright flashing
lights, alerts would become an irritant that few drivers would want. If every
piece of information about a car’s present condition (speed, temperature,
seatbelt use, doors being opened) was scrolling across the dash and spoken
through the speakers, it is possible that they would be turned off or tuned
out.
¶14

¶15
Questions regarding the sufficiency of alerts are questions for the
jury. These questions are questions of degree, are very fact specific, and
cannot be generalized by a bright line rule. Hypothetical cases can be made
which would require a ruling as a matter of law for the plaintiff and others
for the defendant. 23 The existence of such hypotheticals shows that while
not every case must reach a jury, there is a lot of middle room where there
20

Valerio Santangelo & Charles Spence, Multisensory Cues Capture Spatial
Attention Regardless of Perceptual Load,
33 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 1311, 1320
(2007).
21
See Lindsey v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 150 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir.
1998).
22
See Broussard v. Cont’l Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
23
A hypothetical case where an existing alert is proven to be zero percent
effective in conveying an important safety alert and an alternative with one
hundred percent effectiveness exists with no change in cost or aesthetics would
be defective as a matter of law. A hypothetical where a visual alert of a fivepointed star is challenged without research, saying a six-pointed star would give
the specific user a better warning, would not be defective as a matter of law.
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is a reasonable debate about an alert’s effectiveness. Like in traditional
design defect and failure to warn cases, it rests largely on the trier of fact to
say what is reasonable and what is not. This is the proper standard for
automobile alert cases.

III. A FAILURE TO WARN OR A DESIGN DEFECT?
¶16
It is an important distinction to make whether insufficient warnings
of this type constitute a design defect or a failure to warn. Plaintiffs are
permitted to bring a claim under manufacturing and design defects
simultaneously, when the evidence permits. 24 In this way, it becomes less
important for a plaintiff to distinguish between the claims, allowing a jury
to decide which case is stronger. However, many courts do not allow a
plaintiff to submit both a design defect theory and a failure to warn theory
to the jury using identical evidentiary support, forcing most plaintiffs to
choose one theory at the outset of litigation.25 No federal preemption issue
concerning car alarms currently exists, but even without the preemption
concern present with pharmaceuticals 26 and pesticides, 27 it is crucial that
plaintiffs correctly identify the theory under which to bring their claim since
they will only get one bite at the apple. Additionally, though the
requirements of design defects and failure to warn claims are essentially
identical in section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
they are treated differently in the comments 28 and by courts. Courts often
rule as a matter of law in design defect cases, especially if not brought
under a consumer expectations test. 29

A. Insufficient audio and visual alerts as a failure to warn
¶17
At first glance, an insufficient warning system in a car seems to
constitute a failure to warn. A loud beeping noise when a car is accidentally
left in drive, similar to a warning in the owner’s manual to “Always double
check that the car is not accidentally left in drive” might induce someone to
double check which gear they are in when parking. Neither audio warnings

24

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998).
To be clear, a plaintiff can bring both claims if they rest on different facts,
such as if a product was defectively manufactured at time X and the proffered
warnings given at time Y were insufficient, but the same fact cannot lead to a
design defect and a failure to warn. See, e.g., Brown v. Raymond Corp., 432
F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005).
26
See, e.g., Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1631 (2009).
27
See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
28
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (1998).
29
JAMES HENDERSON & AARON TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS 373 (6th ed. 2008).
25
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nor flashing lights affect the functioning of a car; in that way, neither can be
classified as functional safety features, as a guard rail or a dead-man’s
switch would be. Instead they are simply warnings that are conveyed as
audio or visual messages in the cab of a car instead of in writing.
Potential solutions to the problem of cars slipping into reverse
illuminate the difference between alerts and design changes. Such
situations have caused numerous deaths and have been the subject of
numerous lawsuits. 30 By not including such an alert, or by providing an
insufficient alert for the risk and situation,31 a manufacturer may be liable
for failing to warn. Compare this to a design change, altering how the gear
shift works, keeping the car from ever accidentally shifting into reverse.32
Changing the gear shifting mechanism is a functional change and
undoubtedly a design issue. A design change alters the way the car works
while an alert does not. A design change makes a product safer in itself
while an alert does not. An alert brings the consumer’s attention to a risk
while a change in design would be inconspicuous.
¶18

Consider the case of Prince Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 33 In
this case, an airplane gauge incorrectly reported how much usable fuel was
contained in the plane’s fuel tanks. As a consequence, the plane ran out of
fuel and crashed, killing and injuring its passengers. The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit determined that the fuel gauge, which overestimated
the available fuel, along with the instruction manual, which indicated a
larger tank of available fuel, constituted a failure to warn claim and not a
design defect claim. While the court limited its analysis since it determined
the statute of limitations had run, the court explained that the faulty gauges,
the faulty instructions, and the failure to warn of these defects were all a
“failure to warn” claim, even though one aspect (the gauge) is part of the
craft, one aspect (the manual) is a printed warning, and one aspect is a
verbal warning. 34

¶19

30

See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1999);
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 222 S.W.2d 995 (Tex. 1949).
31
A light on the dashboard would be insufficient, since in such a situation the
driver will certainly be exiting the car, probably in a hurry, and is unlikely to
notice a light on the dashboard. A noise alert would be superior. Presumably
for the same reason, many cars use a noise instead of a light for informing the
driver that they are leaving their keys in the ignition or that they are leaving their
headlights on.
32
See Gen. Motors Corp., 997 S.W.2d. at 589–90.
33
952 F.2d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 1991).
34
Id. at 1221–22.
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B. Insufficient audio and visual alerts as a design defect
¶20
There is, however, a second side to such alerts. These alerts do give
warnings, but these warnings are not the same as standard, static warnings.
Typical verbal or written warnings which reference general concerns that
must be kept in mind throughout a products use are static, and the warning
does not give any alert as to present conditions. Instead, car alerts are
conditioned on a car sensor detecting a dangerous condition and
subsequently alerting the driver.
¶21
Such a device, which takes readings and gives important safety
information, acts similarly to a pressure or temperature gauge in an
industrial machine. Such a gauge is a safety feature which does not change
the operation of the machine. However, if such a gauge malfunctions, then
it would likely fall under a design or manufacturing defect. Provided that
adequate warning and instruction were given on the use of the gauge, the
gauge is a unit which can work or fail to work, like any other manufactured
unit.

In Chohlis v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,35 a plane crash was caused by the
plane running out of fuel. The plane had four different fuel tanks and a
switch would alternate between which tank was being used at a given time.
A fuel gauge would indicate the current fuel level in the tank being used.
However, the auxiliary tanks burn fuel at an increased rate. The plaintiff
claimed that the plane’s instrument panel was designed defectively for a
variety of reasons, including the lack of an indicator light to show a tank as
near exhausted. While the jury ultimately determined that the cause was
pilot error, the case was allowed to go to the jury under a design defect
claim. The plaintiff alleged both negligence and strict liability for the
design defect, and also that insufficient warnings were given as to proper
use of the plane. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed, finding that the
lower court had properly handed the situation off to the jury under a design
defect theory and did not mention a possible failure to warn theory.
¶22

Similarly, in McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp., 36 injury
was caused by a helicopter running out of fuel because of an inaccurate fuel
gauge. In this case, the plaintiff seems to have become confused as to
whether he wanted to bring the claim as an “unreasonably dangerous”
design defect claim or a failure to warn. 37 While the court said that he
would lose under either theory, it suggested that the case would have been
best brought as a defective design case.38
¶23

35

760 F.2d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 1985).
245 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2001).
37
Id. at 427.
38
Id.
36
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It is true that in Prince Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 39 the
court said the claim should be viewed as a failure to warn claim and not a
defect claim. However, that was not because the gauge failed to warn of the
low fuel. Rather, the court reasoned that the gauge was “defective and
misrepresented and overstated the amount of usable fuel to the pilot,” and
that the purchasers were not sufficiently warned of this problem. 40

¶24

Looking back to The T.J. Hooper, 41 one can find further support
that insufficient warning devices should be litigated as failed devices rather
than failed warnings. The only defect of the Hooper was its lack of a
receiving radio. Learned Hand never refers to this deficiency as a design
defect or a failure to warn, merely saying it made the tugboat defective and
unseaworthy. 42 However, a finding that a vessel is unseaworthy is
tantamount to a finding of design defect. Seaworthiness requires a vessel,
“including her equipment and crew,”43 be “reasonably fit for the purpose for
which [it] is used.” 44 Examples of conditions that can render a vessel
unseaworthy include defective gear, appurtenances in disrepair, insufficient
manpower, unfit crew, and improper methods of loading or stowing cargo.45
A crewmember tripping when stepping through a hatch does not give rise to
a claim that a vessel is unseaworthy. 46 Neither is a ship unseaworthy
because hatches are left open, allowing water to interfere with the
emergency electrical unit.47 In either of these situations, additional
warnings of the inherent dangers of the boat designs might have prevented
the injuries. However, neither the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit nor the respective plaintiffs brought up failure to warn as a
possible cause of a vessel being unseaworthy.48 Presumably, if such a claim
was available, the plaintiffs would have utilized it, or the court would have
¶25

39

Prince Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir.
1991).
40
Id.
41
The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
42
See id. at 740.
43
Jackson v. OMI Corp., 245 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Gutierrez v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 215 (1963)).
44
In re Matter of Hechinger, 890 F.2d 202, 207 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted).
45
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971).
46
See OMI, 245 F.3d 525, 528 (holding that the district courts finding of
unseaworthiness for a lack of a handrail was clearly erroneous and that the
passageway was reasonably safe for anyone using ordinary common sense).
47
See Folger Coffee Co. v. Olivebank, 201 F.3d 632, 637–38 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that hatches which may be opened or closed being habitually left open
to the damage of instruments did not render the ship unseaworthy).
48
See OMI, 245 F.3d 525; Folger Coffee, 201 F.3d 632.
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likely mentioned it.49 It stands to reason that a failure to warn theory was
not available to them for proving a claim of an unseaworthy vessel.
¶26
The Supreme Court has said that the duty of a boat provider to warn
is a “narrow one,” consisting of only those things that the provider knows or
should know of, which are “neither obvious to nor anticipated by a skilled
[sailor].” 50 In Hooper, the weather on a given day was not known to the
boat owner in advance, nor was the risk of bad weather unknown to
experienced sailors. The sailors were fully aware of the risks and knew how
a radio would have lessened their risks. Clearly, this is not the type of
warning which the court wants boat owners to be required to make. It
stands to reason, therefore, that Learned Hand meant that an ineffective
alert system is a defect in the product itself, making the product unsafe for
use. Such a deficiency is a design defect.

C. The continued importance of the design/warning distinction
¶27
The answer to this problem cannot be found in legislative history.
No law states whether triggered alerts constitute warnings which can be
insufficient, or safety devices which can be designed defectively. Nor is
there a clear, judicially proscribed solution. The cases occasionally suggest
that one theory is better for the situation, but never go into an analysis on
why one is improper.

At first blush, the characterization of design defect versus failure to
warn is nothing but a strategic choice, with no legally wrong answer.51
However, these two theories are distinct and must remain so.
¶28

It is sometimes said that inadequate or no warnings at all constitute—
and are merely one form of—a design “defect;” and, that because
knowledge of the dangerous character of a product is imputed in a
strict liability design defect case it should also be imputed when the
plaintiff alleges that the product is defective unless there is an
accompanying warning of its dangerous character. Unfortunately, such
an analysis is both overly simplistic and not warranted as a matter of
policy. The initial purpose for allowing recovery under a failure to
warn theory was that certain products are inherently dangerous for
their intended or foreseeable uses, but these products should not be
49

E.g., Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007); Capitol Park
Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass’n v. Jackson, 202 F.App’x 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2006);
Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 577 (6th
Cir. 2002). In these cases, the Court addressed causes of action which might
have been raised by the parties.
50
Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92, 105 (1994).
51
See generally Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001) (dealing with
warnings and defects without emphasizing a distinction between them).
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considered unreasonably dangerous as designed because they are
beneficial to society and designed as flawlessly and economically
feasible as possible. 52

The language used by both the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability and the courts creates separate causes of action for design
defects and failures to warn, but uses similar language to describe the
causes of action. 53 The wording of the two causes of action is similar, but
this similarity suggests the importance of the distinction. The similarities
show the ease by which the two theories could be combined if such a result
was intended or desirable. This has not been done, and the distinction has
been maintained.
¶29

¶30
Judges should not allow cases of insufficient alerts and gauges to
reach the jury under the plaintiff’s choice of theory. As a matter of law,
deficient alerts are either insufficient warnings or a defective safety feature,
not both. While the law will allow a claimant to smudge the lines between
defects when the nature of the defect is unknowable,54 this is the exception
allowed to prevent injustice. The separation of defect claims into
manufacturing, design, and warning allow for clearer jury instructions and
the development of appropriate rules concerning each. 55

D. Triggered alerts are safety features and their insufficiencies
constitute design defects
There is a fine line between making a product safe to use by proper
design and making a product’s use safe by warning of the relevant dangers.
A car’s side mirror is a safety-oriented design feature, while the print
“objects in mirror are closer than they appear” is a warning to make the
mirror and the car’s use safer. If the print were missing, the mirror would
not become defectively designed for making objects seem far away; the
mirror’s very purpose is to show a wider angle of view. Likewise, mirrors
which do not point in a useful direction make a car unsafe to operate, no
matter how many warnings are given.
¶31

Similarly, engine temperature gauges are safety features which
measure an objective fact which is salient to the driver. Improper
instructions as to how to use or read the temperature gauge would not

¶32

52

Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 393–94 (Mo.
1986).
53
See, e.g., Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 288 F.App’x 597, 605–06
(11th Cir. 2008); Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., 473 F.3d 532 (3d Cir.
2007) (analyzing a claim of design defect and a claim of failure to warn as two
separate claims). Cf. Merrill, 28 P.3d 116.
54
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998).
55
See generally Merrill, 28 P.3d 116.
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render a gauge defective, but would instead constitute a failure to warn.
Compare this to McLennan. 56 In that case, the failure to warn argument was
not that the faulty gauge failed to warn him about the low fuel level.
Rather, his failure to warn claim rested on the manufacturer failing to warn
of the inherent unreliability of the fuel gauge. 57
¶33
If an alert in a car fails to detect the existence of an alert-worthy
event (the fuel is low, the car is still in drive, the engine is overheating, etc.)
then it is clearly a design defect. An item in the car’s makeup was designed
to judge the fuel/gear/temp and failed to do so. Assuming there is a more
reliable and reasonable alternative design for the sensor, the manufacturer
should be liable under the design defect rule. If the sensor acts properly but
the alert itself fails to go off, then the light/sound producing part of the car
is defective. While it is a “warning device,” it is still making the car safer
by informing the driver of the current state of the car. This diagnostic
device can fail, but doing so is a product not working as intended; the
device failing is not caused by a lack of instruction by the manufacturer. By
contrast, if the alert goes off as intended, but the manufacturer failed to
instruct the user of the meaning of the alert, then there is a failure to warn.
Information such as “if the engine gauge says the car is too hot, then turn
the engine off” doesn’t make the car work more safely, but is crucial for the
safe operation of the car.
¶34
Such an instruction, warning the customer that an alert of a hot
engine means they should shut the engine off, is the exact type of warning
contemplated by statute and jurisprudence. Such a warning belongs in an
instruction manual, or should be told to the customer at the time of sale.
Such an instruction is a warning that must only be learned once, and
instructs on how to use the vehicle safely. By contrast, the alert that the car
is too hot at a specific time could not be told ahead of time or sufficiently
explained in an owner’s manual. The driver has no way of sensing the
temperature of the engine absent a sensor. This sensor is a product which
the owner will rely on to inform his of the state of the car, which will then
allow him to use the warnings and instructions on how to use the car
appropriately.
¶35
Assume a sensor accurately assesses an emergency situation and
properly gives off its visual or audio alert. Assume also that the driver was
adequately instructed on the car’s safety and alert systems and the
seriousness with which one should take emergency alerts. However, the
alert fails to get the driver’s attention or fails to motivate him to the proper
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McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 432–34. In this case, the unreliability of the fuel gauge was not the
relevant issue. The failure to warn claim consisted solely of the manufacturer’s
explanation of how to use and interpret the alert equipment. Id.
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action (perhaps the indicator is a light with an intentionally dim bulb). This
bulb and alert are not instructions, though it requires the warnings and
instructions to properly interpret the alert and to know what to do. This
light is a safety feature of the car intended for the purpose of alerting the
driver. If this bulb, as designed, does not serve its intended purpose, it is
designed defectively. Drivers cannot determine the current state of the car
and therefore the car is unsafe. A dim bulb that does not motivate the driver
to action is effectively the same as a sensor that does not work. While
courts have held that a manufacturer is protected by a “rebuttable
presumption that an adequate warning ‘would have been read and
heeded,’” 58 it is unreasonable to say that any warning light (including those
with minimal illumination) will be noticed. The desired result of the safety
system, namely to make known the state of the vehicle, has failed.

CONCLUSION
Product defect cases involving car alerts should generally be passed
along to the finder of fact as with all other design defect cases. While some
cases will certainly involve findings of law concerning reasonableness, the
vast majority of cases should be judged by a reasonable jury. Such a claim
should be restricted to a design defect theory of liability, as a failure to warn
theory would ignore the purpose and capabilities of such alerts and
contravene the intent of standing defect law.
¶36
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Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
Woulfe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 965 F. Supp. 1478 (E.D. Okla. 1997)).

